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ABSTRACT 
 
INTRODUCTION: Cost-effectiveness thresholds (CETs) are used to judge if an intervention 
represents sufficient value for money to merit adoption in healthcare systems. The study was 
motivated by the Brazilian context of HTA, where meetings are being conducted to decide on the 
definition of a threshold. AREAS COVERED: An electronic search was conducted on Medline (via 
PubMed), Lilacs (via BVS) and ScienceDirect followed by a complementary search of references of 
included studies, Google Scholar and conference abstracts. Cost-effectiveness thresholds are usually 
calculated through three different approaches: the willingness-to-pay, representative of welfare 
economics; the precedent method, based on the value of an already funded technology; and the 
opportunity cost method, which links the threshold to the volume of health displaced. An explicit 
threshold has never been formally adopted in most places. Some countries have defined thresholds, 
with some flexibility to consider other factors. An implicit threshold could be determined by research of 
funded cases. EXPERT COMMENTARY: CETs havHKDGDQLPSRUWDQWUROHDVD³EULGJLQJFRQFHSW´
EHWZHHQWKHZRUOGRIDFDGHPLFUHVHDUFKDQGWKH³UHDOZRUOG´RIKHDOWKFDUHSULRULWL]DWLRQ The 
definition of a cost-effectiveness threshold is paramount for the construction of a transparent and 
efficient Health Technology Assessment system. 
 
KEYWORDS: Cost-Benefit Analysis; Cost-Effectiveness Analysis; Economics, Medical; Economics, 
Pharmaceutical; Expert Testimony; Review; Technology Assessment, Biomedical. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Health technology assessment (HTA) relies on evaluations of the clinical, epidemiological and 
economic data to make decisions about the allocation of the scarce resources of public healthcare [1, 
2, 3]. The centerpiece of a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is the incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratio (ICER), which measures the differential cost for a unit of extra benefit gained from a new 
therapeutic strategy [2, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In most cases, new technologies that apply for public funding 
present higher costs and effectiveness than the technologies currently in use [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. 
For a new technology to be recommended based on economic assessments, several authorities have 
argued that the ICER must be compared to a cost-effectiveness threshold (CET) value that should 
represent the highest acceptable cost for an extra unit of benefit [2, 5, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].  
 
Despite the economic evaluations being a mandatory part of the process of HTA in many countries, 
such as Brazil, USA, Canada and Australia, an explicit CET value has never been established for the 
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assessment of new technologies in their national health systems [19, 20, 21]. Many countries do not 
specify a threshold arguing that the benefits of doing so are controversial [5, 14, 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, 
24, 25]. It has been suggested that the use of an explicit threshold could give manufacturers an 
LQFHQWLYHWR³ELGXS´WKHLUSULFHWRWKH,&(5OHYHODQGWKDWLWFRXOGDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWWKHIOH[LELOLW\RI
decision makers, although there is little evidence of the latter [7, 13, 26, 27, 28]. In addition, an explicit 
CET might trigger a reevaluation of previous funding decisions [13]. The adoption of high threshold 
levels may contribute to the increase of health expenditures and decrease of coverage, especially 
among low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) [14, 29, 30]. Conversely, the establishment of 
appropriate methods for the definition of the threshold can be useful to the national health systems as 
a way to better negotiate prices, bring transparency into decision-making and improve value for 
money in public healthcare [15, 18, 23, 31, 32, 33].  
 
The lack of a standard method for determining thresholds [34] appears to have given manufacturers a 
way to justify applications for new medicines with higher prices, which disproportionally affects LMICs 
[5, 14, 30, 35]. This study aims to review the methods to establish the threshold and present some 
examples of values implicitly or explicitly defined around the world. We discuss what would constitute 
an adequate and reasonable method to establish a threshold and the implications of an explicit CET 
to HTA. The study was motivated by the Brazilian context of HTA, where meetings are being 
conducted to decide on the explicit definition of a CET [36].  
 
This objective was pursued through a literature review. An electronic search on the databases of 
Medline (via PubMed), Lilacs (via BVS) and Science Direct was performed to identify publications 
dealing with methods for the definition of CETs and cases of countries that have a standard value on 
which to base recommendations, followed by a complementary search in the references of included 
studies, Google Scholar and conference abstracts. The searches were performed on January 2017. 
The results were divided into three sections: the first describes the main methods for the definition of 
a CET; the second reports cases where the threshold has been defined or inferred around the world; 
and the third reflects on the implications of thresholds for HTA. We selected agencies and countries 
that were representative of a variety of healthcare systems.  
 
2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES FOR THE DEFINITION OF A COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
THRESHOLD 
 
Most research on cost-effectiveness thresholds suggests its definition through three different 
approaches [13, 37, 38]: the willingness-to-pay (WTP) method for a unit of outcome, representative of 
the welfare economics theory; the precedent method, that is based in the value of an already funded 
technology; and the opportunity cost method, that links the threshold to the volume of health 
displaced by new technologies, considering the existence of restricted budgets. Other methods have 
been developed or adapted over the last few years. One of these is IQWiG´s efficiency frontier [39, 
40]. 
 
2.1 The Willingness-to-Pay method 
 
In this method, the threshold is estimated through preference data collected directly from the 
population with contingent valuation surveys, or indirectly, from the behavior of the individual in the 
market, WTP for a reduction of mortality or willingness-to-accept (WTA) for a risk [18, 41]. These 
methods are intended to elicit the maximum value that an individual would be willing to disburse to 
obtain a determined amount of health improvement, usually a small difference in utility aggregated to 
generate the value for a quality-adjusted life year (QALY) [41, 42]. Initially, the utility difference 
between two health states is estimated, commonly through time trade-off or standard gamble; and 
then the WTP is elicited for that difference [41, 43]. 
 
The contingent valuation method consists on the application of a structured questionnaire with all 
relevant information about the technologies and comparators, health conditions and context to inform 
respondents prior to the decision [42, 44, 45]. The WTP value can be elicited through a direct open-
ended question; a bidding game, with a direct question followed by increases and decreases of value, 
until a point estimate is reached; payment cards, with values for the respondent to choose; and a 
discrete choiFHZKHUHUHVSRQGHQWVDQVZHUDVLQJOH³\HV´RU³QR´TXHVWLRQIROORZHGE\VWDWLVWLFDO
assessment of the data [42, 44]. The questionnaire should, preferably, be applied on face-to-face 
interviews and respondents must be reminded of the opportunity costs and therapeutic alternatives 
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[45, 46]. Bidding game and discrete choice are more common and reliable methods to assess the 
WTP [42, 44, 46, 47]. It is worth noting that WTP and WTA values, contrary to initial theoretical 
predictions, are substantially different from each other. This difference is a consequence of the 
endowment effect. The endowment effect is associated with loss aversion and failure to anticipate 
ownership utility. So, in terms of preferences, losses are weighted substantially more than gains [48, 
49]. 
 
Individual preferences do not directly convert into affordability considering that individual valuation of 
health benefits is detached from the budget-setting process and can only very indirectly influence it 
[41, 50]. Consequently, WTP estimates on the CET usually return higher threshold values compared 
to the opportunity cost approach [18, 38]. Since the WTP threshold is not attached to the budget, 
these methods might not lead to maximization of health [3, 29, 51].  
 
Contingent valuation might not provide an accurate assessment of WTP/QALY. Welfare states mostly 
rely on a social protection mechanism based on principles of social justice and solidarity [52, 53]. It 
has been shown that individuals might not be as willinJWRSD\IRURWKHUSHRSOH¶VKHDOWKDVPXFKDV
they would pay for their own. Shiroiwa et al. [43] REVHUYHGGLIIHUHQFHVIRULQGLYLGXDO¶VYDOXDWLRQRI
WTP/QALY for society, oneself or family, with the order of preference being dependent on the 
context. The WTP/QALY depends on the severity, rarity and social stigma of the disease [5, 23, 25, 
54, 55] and individuals might have little feel for choices which are so remote from their day to day 
experience and concerns. For example, Blumstein [56] states that people have a belief that 
democratic governments should protect life at any cost, yet, are unwilling to pay the price necessary 
to achieve that objective.  
 
2.2 The Precedent method 
 
Another way to estimate the threshold is based on the cost-effectiveness of an intervention that has 
already been approved for funding. The values of 50,000 USD/QALY in the USA or the updated 
values of 100,000 or 150,000 USD/QALY are examples of these [16, 25, 57, 58, 59]. The general idea 
is that if society already pays for some treatment, any alternatives with higher efficiency would be 
acceptable. This arbitrary threshold might be too high or too low, as there is no reason to suppose 
that previous decisions were taken rationally [2]. The value may, for example, be defined by a political 
decision rather than more evidence-based models, and be subject to exploitation, as seen with 
medicines for cancer and orphan diseases [16, 18, 60, 61, 62]. In addition, this approach does not 
take into consideration the affordability of interventions, running the risk of uncontrolled growth in 
healthcare costs [16, 59, 63, 64], and might lead to more losses than gains in terms of health 
outcomes [13, 29]. The precedent threshold values are usually fixed, not subjected to depreciation 
when efficient alternatives appear or adjustment for inflation [16, 59]. 
 
2.3 The Opportunity Costs method 
 
The opportunity cost approach can be traced back to the work of Weinstein and Zeckhauser, in the 
1970s, on the maximization of outcomes with resource constraints [3]. It assumes that the budget will 
be fully spent trying to obtain the maximum possible health returns by allocating from the most 
efficient to the least efficient interventions [3, 29]. The opportunity costs are measured in health 
benefits forgone [29], that should be expressed in units of health that associate mortality and 
morbidity (e.g.  QALYs or disability-adjusted life years [DALYs]). The basic principles of the model are 
that the CET cannot be calculated independently of the health budget and the incorporation of new 
technologies, that imposes additional costs to the health system, might provoke displacement of 
already funded interventions [26, 29, 41]. Technologies with ICER values lower than the threshold 
should provide a positive balance between health benefits gained and lost [13, 17, 18, 29, 35, 38, 64]. 
Optimal reallocation would involve expansion the most cost-effective technologies by displacing the 
least cost-effective programs and services [13, 18, 37, 51]. Multiple thresholds may be required in 
systems where there are separate budgets for separate types of healthcare interventions within the 
same healthcare system [13, 29], although splitting health budgets can be shown to be in general 
suboptimal [18]. 
 
Some authors suggest that the opportunity cost threshold could be better estimated through a league 
table [41]. A cost-effectiveness league table lists alternative therapeutic strategies in order of 
desirability based on their ICERs and allocates them until the limit of the budget is reached [3, 29]. It 
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can be applied within specific conditions or across the entire system [65]. The CET would be the last 
accepted ICER [2, 16, 18, 57, 66]. The bookshelf model can be considered another way to represent 
the league tables. It consists of a bi-dimensional graph computing the Effectiveness-Cost Ratio (ECR) 
in the y-axis and the budget impact on the x-axis.  The product of the axes would provide the health 
benefit of society with that technology. The alternatives should be allocated until the limit of the health 
budget. The Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (CER, inverse of the ECR) of the last funded technology 
corresponds to the CET [22, 29, 51].  
 
The application of the league table/bookshelf model to express opportunity costs is difficult. The 
construction of the tables would require the existence of quality information on costs and benefits for 
all the technologies, that might not be available [26, 67], especially for new interventions in LMICs. All 
interventions have to be evaluated with the same method to allow direct comparisons. Another 
problem is that social preferences expressed by political decisions are not taken into account. The 
league tables, however, are capable of combining measures of efficiency with affordability, since the 
size of the list depends on the available budget [14, 16, 18, 24, 25, 56, 68], and have been used to 
rank interventions on HIV and cardiovascular disease [65]. If correctly constructed, a cost per QALY 
league table could provide information for decision-making [68]. 
 
Claxton et al. [17] aggregated the data on changes in overall English National Health Service 
expenditure, changes in mortality and age- and gender-adjusted quality-of-life to determine a CET 
IURPDVXSSO\VLGHRSSRUWXQLW\FRVWDSSURDFK,IDWHFKQRORJ\¶V,&(5LVORZHUWKDQthe CET, then its 
funding would generate more utility gains than benefits foregone on average [17, 51]. This might be 
the best approach to set a CET so far [29] as it avoids the difficulty of having to analyze all 
technologies in the system, despite the difficulties with the reliability of data on quality-adjusted life 
H[SHFWDQF\DQGWKHSDUWLDOLJQRUDQFHRISHRSOH¶VSUHIHUHQFHV 
 
There are controversies on whether the application of such thresholds improves health benefits 
conditionally, considering that the least cost-effective technologies would be displaced, or 
unconditionally, regardless of what might be displaced in actual practice. Approaching the 
displacement without concerns of which technologies will be displaced might lead to suboptimal 
reallocation [29, 51]. For scenarios of suboptimal allocation, Eckermann & Pekarsky [51] proposed the 
use of a shadow price and a CET to adjust the system towards allocative efficiency. If the cost of the 
new technology were adjusted to achieve the calculated CET then the net health benefits would be 
the same as the optimal reallocation process. Paulden et al. [69] claim that this approach is unlikely to 
be adopted in practice until there are processes to identify the least and most cost-effective 
technologies as budgets expand and contract. 
 
Some limitations of this approach are that the healthcare decision-makers are considered maximizers 
of health, without regard for other objectives of the system (e.g. promotion of access to innovations 
and reduction of social inequalities) and measurement problems, such as imperfect or lack of 
information [69]. It also ignores society´s valuation of health improvements for threshold-setting 
purposes [41]. Optimal reallocation can involve eliminating effective technologies, which might be 
politically very difficult due to internally ranked interventions and the endowment effect [2, 29, 52, 70, 
71]. Internally ranked interventions refer to technologies that might be more effective for some types 
of patients than others. Better targeting would be a strategy to reallocate the resources expended on 
them [29, 31].  
 
The determinants of the threshold are the underlying demographics and disease burden, local 
environments, culture and social values, and the health budget [26, 29]. The threshold is also 
dependent on the perspective and context of the decision since different policy-makers are likely to 
have different budget constraints (e.g. government and other healthcare funders) [14]. Different 
perspectives (e. g. societal, third party, individual) might limit the comparability of values between 
countries. For instance, different countries assess the value and funding of new medicines for orphan 
diseases and cancer differently due to issues of unmet need, the perceived emotive nature of the 
disease and patient expectations [23, 60, 61, 62, 71].  
 
3 COST-EFFECTIVENESS THRESHOLD VALUES AROUND THE WORLD 
 
In most countries, an explicit cost-effectiveness threshold has never been formally adopted. Some 
countries defined a threshold to be used in the limits of their decisions with some flexibility to consider 
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other factors, such as the UK. In other countries, an implicit one could be determined by research on 
past decisions. A comparison of the implicit or explicit cost-effectiveness thresholds of the evaluated 
regions can be found in Supplementary Materials. In the remainder of this section we summarize our 
findings, first at the international level, and then for individual countries in Europe, Asia and the 
Americas. 
 
3.1 International  
 
The most commonly referred cost-effectiveness threshold at the international level is based on a year 
of perfect health referred by the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health and published by the 
WHO [14, 15, 16, 72]. The primarily objective seemed to be to connect the threshold to an objective 
national benchmark associated to affordability [18] and to suggest that the value of a utility-adjusted 
life year should reflect factors beyond market income, such as changes in longevity, pain and 
suffering [14]. IQWKHUHVSRQVLEOHSDUWLHVRIWKH:+2¶V&KRRVLQJ,QWHUYHQWLRQVWKDWDUH&RVW±
Effective project (WHO-CHOICE) suggested that therapeutic alternatives that add less than three 
GDP per capita/DALY should be considered cost-effective. This value has been applied as threshold 
in economic studies around the world [1, 14, 15, 16, 72, 73]. More recently, the WHO seems to be 
trying to dissociate themselves from this initial recommendation as it does not fit many contexts [1, 15, 
16, 73]. 
 
This approach has major limitations and has been criticized by health economists [14, 30]. The GDP-
based threshold is usually found to be above the opportunity cost threshold [15, 17, 35, 72], meaning 
that it offers a poor constraint to the incorporation of new technologies into the system. Consequently, 
it does not effectively discriminate between interventions that offer good from bad value for money [2, 
16], exposes the system to the risk of unacceptable budget increases as new medicines are launched 
and might provoke more health losses than gains.  
 
Woods et al. [35] used a method that relies on the definitions of income elasticity curves for the Value 
of a Statistical Life (VSL) to generate a range of values of threshold, based on the analysis of the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence´s (NICE) threshold and the difference in GDP per 
capita between countries, assuming that the curves would be stable across countries. They estimated 
a threshold of 3 to 116 USD/QALY for Malawi (1%±51% GDP per capita), 44 to 518 (4%±51% GDP 
per capita) for Cambodia, 422 to 1,967 (11%±51% GDP per capita) for El Salvador, 472 to 1,786 
(14%±51% GDP per capita) for Indonesia, 4,485 to 8,018 (33%±59% GDP per capita) for 
Kazakhstan, 4,896 to 9,436 (31%±60% GDP per capita) for Chile, 25,292 to 31,915 (43%±93% GDP 
per capita) for Canada, 24,283 to 40,112 (46%±75% GDP per capita) for the USA, 43,211 to 93,736 
(46%±75% GDP per capita) for Norway, and 43,092 to 143,342 (39%±129% GDP per capita) for 
Luxembourg.  
 
Shiroiwa et al. [43] used contingent valuation, capturing data from six countries from an internet-
based survey, to determine the CET in some countries in 2010. He found, for the estimation of 
WTP/QALY for the individual, family and society, values of 41,000 to 52,000 USD in Japan, 74,000 to 
86,000 USD in Korea, 66,000 to 77,000 USD in Taiwan, 36,000 to 60,000 USD in the UK, 47,000 to 
66,000 USD in Australia and 62,000 to 96,000 USD in the USA. The questionnaire was relatively 
simple and considered that the individual had a life-threatening condition that could potentially end 
his/her life instantaneously, which is methodologically undesirable. These publications [35, 43] 
exemplify the argument that WTP measures tend to lead to higher threshold values than opportunity 
cost approaches.  
 
3.2 Brazil 
 
The legislation in Brazil does not establish a CET [19, 20, 74, 75]. Nevertheless, it is very common to 
find mentions to one to three GDP per capita/QALY, as in the recommendations of Brazilian 
Guidelines [74]. Analyses of the decisions of the Brazilian HTA agency (CONITEC) found that the 
recommendations made were not largely influenced by the economic evaluations [76, 77, 78] and 
failed to derive a CET through a previous decision analysis [77, 78, 79, 80]. Economic evaluation 
seems to be a secondary criterion to the recommendations. However, Pichon-Riviere et al. [81] found 
through a research method based on health expenditures and life expectancy that the threshold for 
Brazil should be between 0.62-1.05 GDP per capita/QALY. 
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3.3 United States of America (USA) 
 
A retrospective study failed to determine a cost-effectiveness threshold for Medicare decisions [82]. 
There is, although, a frequently referred precedent value of 50,000 USD/QALY in USA-based CEAs 
[82].  This value seems to have first been introduced to evaluate the interventions for end-stage renal 
disease patients of Medicare in the 1980s [25, 59] and gained widespread use in the 1990s [25]. More 
recently, the values of 100,000 to 150,000 USD/QALY have been used in publications [58]. The 
increase on the value of the threshold is advantageous pharmaceutical companies, who are 
subsequently able to seek higher prices for its innovations [16, 57, 58, 83].  
 
3.4 England 
 
Since 2004, NICE operates with an explicit value to be applied to candidate technologies for 
reimbursement with some flexibility that allows the system to take into account additional relevant 
factors, including social preferences [13, 17, 34]. A threshold of 20,000 GBP/QALY was set and could 
be increased to 30,000 GBP/QALY upon four considerations: certainty of ICER; inadequately 
evaluated health-related quality of life; innovation; and other non-health objectives of NICE [2, 84]. 
Technologies with an ICER up to 50,000 GBP/QALY could still be recommended if they were 
associated with life extending treatments as part of end-of-life care [2, 15, 17, 21, 84].  Claxton et al. 
[17] estimated, through an opportunity cost approach, a point estimate of 12,936 GBP/QALY for the 
CET. They strongly argue that the threshold value considered by NICE might be too high, given the 
restricted budget limits within the UK. It has also been argued that increasing the threshold value for 
other factors might be harming unidentified users that bear the opportunity cost [4, 84, 85].  
 
3.5 Canada 
 
The Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH) does not explicitly state a CET. 
Nevertheless, a value of 50,000 CAD/QALY based on precedent is often cited. Griffiths et al. [86] 
suggested, from retrospective analysis, that the value is considered when decisions state a need for 
reductions in prices (to achieve the ICER < 50,000 CAD/QALY) or to reinforce the decision (the ICER 
was under 50,000 CAD/QALY). Other interventions with higher ICERs were also recommended 
during the study period, demonstrating that the cost-effectiveness is not a sine qua non condition for 
recommendation. A review of past decisions of the Canadian Expert Drug Advisory Committee 
(CEDAC) from 2003 to 2007 reported a threshold of over 70,000 CAD/QALY or LYG [2]. 
 
3.6 Thailand 
 
In 2007, Thailand regulators determined a threshold of 100,000 THB/QALY, equivalent to 0.8 GDP 
per capita. In time, this threshold been interpreted as becoming a powerful instrument for price 
negotiation [15]. More recently, the commissioners of health technology assessment recommended 
that the threshold should not be higher than 1.2 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, which 
represented 160,000 THB/QALY in 2013 [87].  
 
3.7 Australia 
 
Australia was one of the first countries to place explicit emphasis on economic evidence as a decision 
criterion for funding health technologies [13]. The Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
Committee (PBAC) does not state an explicit CET for decision-making [13, 88, 89]. Harris et al. [33] 
showed that the incremental cost per QALY has a significant negative influence in the decisions, with 
increase of 10,000 AUD/QALY associated with a reduction of 0.06 on the chance of listing. The study 
was not able to define a threshold, but the results suggest a strong relationship between value for 
money and likelihood of public reimbursement of drugs [33]. 
 
3.8 Poland 
 
In Poland, a general threshold of three GPD per capita/QALY or LYG was legally established in 2012 
[15, 32, 90, 91]. A respective analysis conducted by Niewada et al. [92], published in 2013, found the 
CEA to be important for the explanation of negative recommendations from the Agency for Health 
Technology Assessment in Poland (AHTAPol), but they did not find a clear relationship between cost-
effectiveness and budget impact for positive or negative recommendations. Clinical efficacy was 
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considered the most important criterion to guide decisions and cost-effectiveness seems to be 
perceived as a secondary factor [92].   
 
3.9 Germany 
 
The agency for HTA in Germany (IQWiG) uses an efficiency frontier model to issue recommendations 
on the reimbursement of new technologies [32, 39, 40, 93, 94]. Under IQWiG´s Efficiency Frontier 
(EF) approach, all the relevant interventions for a specific condition are identified and plotted in a 
cost-effectiveness plane on which costs are on the horizontal axis and health effects on the vertical 
axis [40, 94, 95]. Only interventions that lie on the efficiency frontier are considered. The CET for a 
new intervention is formed as an extension of the ICER between the two existing most effective 
interventions.  The ICER for the entrant technology is formed by its comparison with the existing most 
effective technology. Alternatives under the efficiency frontier are absolutely or extendedly dominated 
[18, 39, 40, 94]. The slope of the frontier tends to decrease as benefits increase, representing 
diminishing marginal returns [40]. The perspective adopted considers the costs that citizens bear, 
including personal health costs that are usually excluded from health economic evaluations [40]. 
 
For IQWiG, the EF does not provide a decision rule. Decisions are taken on basis beyond efficiency 
[40]. The focus is on establishing relative health benefit in well-defined therapeutic areas, not setting 
priorities across the system [40]. In addition, it is predicated on the view that patients should not be 
excluded from treatment based on costs only [40], without assessment of opportunity costs and 
displacement of technologies. The economic evaluations only consider technologies judged to be 
superior on the benefit analysis [40], raising an issue with the impossibility of funding less effective 
technologies even if they are cheaper. Sculpher & Claxton [96] argue that the interpretation of the 
context of decision by the Panel that recommended the EF is too narrow, fails to define the concept of 
value, does not consider opportunity costs in the health sector or other areas, gives little attention to 
the way outcomes should be measured, and fails to examine the implications and to properly address 
the challenges to be met by the approach. The implementation of separate CETs for each area leads 
to suboptimal resource allocation [18]. 
 
3.10 Ireland 
 
Irish regulators legally established a 45,000 EUR/QALY threshold for HTA of pharmaceuticals in 
2012, after an agreement between government and the pharmaceutical industry [97, 98]. This value 
substituted the previous implicit threshold of 20,000 EUR/QALY. New medicines with ICERs below 
45,000 EUR/QALY will have its reimbursement guaranteed, and the prices of other new medicines 
would be further negotiated. It has been argued that the value chosen has no empirical basis and 
should be revised to account for opportunity costs [97, 98]. 
 
3.11 Japan 
 
In Japan, the CEAs acquired official status in 2016. So far, there is no consensus on the threshold 
ZLWKDXWKRUVUHIHUULQJWR1,&(¶VWKUHVKROGWR*%34$/<0RUHUHFHQWVWXGLHV
calculated the CET, through a WTP approach, being between 25,000 and 100,000 USD/QALY for 
different scenarios of disease status and end-of-life conditions [99].  
 
3.12 Sweden 
 
The implicit threshold for the Swedish Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV) is estimated 
to be between 700,000 and 1,220,000 SEK/QALY (80,000 and 135,000 EUR/QALY). Each 1000 SEK 
increase in the cost per QALY decreased the probability of subsidy in 0.06. Up to the cost per QALY 
of 500,000 SEK (56,500 EUR), which is considered a rule-of-thumb for the threshold in Sweden, the 
likelihood of approval would be 91 to 98% for non-severe and severe diseases, respectively [23]. 
 
3.13 New Zealand 
 
The Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) has currently no explicit CET. PHARMAC 
operates under a fixed budget. The CEA is only one of nine criteria used to make decisions and a 
technology can only be considered cost-effective if it is prioritized against other proposals at the time 
[100, 101, 102].  
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3.14 Netherlands 
 
Health economic assessments are routinely used for reimbursement decisions of new technologies in 
the Netherlands, supposedly with limited impact [71]. There is no formal CET. The Health Care 
Insurance Board (CVZ, now renamed Zorginstituut Nederland) suggests a range of threshold values 
to be applied on HTA studies of 10,000 to 80,000 EUR/QALY, depending on the severity of the 
disease [71]. This value is not a proper threshold since it is just indicative and not predictive of the 
decision. Their advice is based upon the balance of different criteria [71, 103]. Other values reported 
in the literature are 20,000 EUR/QALY [104, 105] and 20,000 to 50,000 EUR/QALY [106]. 
 
3.15 Norway 
 
There is no official threshold value to be applied in HTA studies in Norway [107]. Nevertheless, a 
threshold value of 500,000 NOK/QALY is commonly cited in the literature [108, 109]. The third 
Norwegian Committee on Priority Setting in the Health Sector recently released a new framework for 
setting priorities in the health system based on maximization of health, burden of disease, equity, 
transparency, user participation, and systematic and effective analyses. The Committee 
recommended the determination of thresholds, through an opportunity cost approach, based on the 
health loss associated with the condition in three classes [55]. Therefore, the more health loss caused 
by the disease will make the threshold for the interventions higher and consequently drive up prices. 
The actual threshold values were not established. 
 
4 CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF THRESHOLDS IN HEALTH TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENTS 
 
0HGLFDOLQQRYDWLRQVKDYHPDGHDJUHDWFRQWULEXWLRQWRSHRSOH¶VVXUYLYDODQGTXDOLW\RIOLIH
Nevertheless, healthcare systems are showing difficulties to fund premium-priced new drugs [102, 
110, 111, 112]. The incremental relationship between costs and effectiveness of therapeutic 
alternatives is expressed as an ICER that must be compared to an acceptable threshold value to 
issue a recommendation. A well-established threshold can help improve transparency in HTA, 
diminish the arbitrariness in the decision process, support the sustainability of the health system, 
become a tool for price negotiation and increase the confidence that funding decisions are actually 
improving population health [13, 15, 21, 41, 57, 113].  
 
The application of a fixed cost-effectiveness threshold set through WTP or a precedent decision can 
be contested [3, 18]. These approaches might lead to significant increases in healthcare spending 
and new technology prices [18, 41, 64]. Opportunity cost models commonly consider decision-makers 
as maximizers of health [3, 29, 50, 51, 114]. The basic underlying idea is that, given a budget 
constraint, policy-makers would take decisions focusing on maximizing health benefits by allocating 
technologies in the system from the most efficient to the least efficient until the limit of the budget is 
reached [3, 29]. The CER of the least efficient technology funded would correspond to the CET [22, 
29, 51].  
 
It has been suggested that pharmaceutical companies take the price of other approved medicines for 
the same diagnosis to set increasingly higher launch prices for their new medicines, which for 
instance has been leading to increasing costs for drugs for cancer treatment over the years [8, 12, 
115, 116]. The process in which the manufacturers base the prices of new medicines on the price of 
already marketed medicines rather than associate it to the therapeutic benefit was described by 
Howard et al. [10] as reference pricing. The authors suggest that generous third-party coverage that 
make patients insensitive to prices, financial incentives to physicians and hospitals to adopt new 
technologies and the lack of substitute alternatives are some of the reasons that give manufactures 
the opportunity to charge higher prices for cancer pharmaceuticals even when they have very limited 
health gain over existing standards [9, 10, 11]. However, there are increasing concerns for price 
moderation among all key stakeholder groups in the US especially given recent publications 
suggesting that the cost of goods of some new cancer medicines can be as low as 1% of the selling 
price [115, 117, 118]. In addition, CETs defined above the value for a context with scarcity allow 
pharmaceutical companies to seek higher price levels, through threshold pricing [34]. The application 
of value-based pricing (VBP) in the healthcare system is already a reality [2, 5, 11].  VBP is a process 
in which new technologies are priced according to the added benefit to people´s health. There is a 
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tendency not to accept high prices for technologies that do not deliver value in comparison to existing 
alternatives, through transparent and valid methods [34]. 
 
The threshold and CEAs have an important role in VBP. When the ICER of a new technology is close 
to the cost-effectiveness threshold defined by opportunity costs, the system is paying the 
manufacturers the intrinsic value of the product. In that case, threshold pricing would be working in 
favor of efficiency. To pay more than that would be to pay more for the innovation than it is worth. 
Since the opportunity cost models work with the assumption that all the budget will be spent to 
achieve maximization of health and that the opportunity costs would be derived from the displacement 
of technologies to accommodate the new intervention into the system, to adopt higher prices would 
represent a negative balance in health benefits [26, 27, 29]. Arguably, the proximity between HTA, the 
threshold and VBP indicates that the same independent authority should assess the cost-
effectiveness, determine prices and issue guidance to the health system [27]. 
 
VBP tends to lower the prices in the market and restrict the number of funded therapeutic alternatives. 
Because of it, only really innovative technologies, orphan drugs and cheaper generic drugs have 
shown increasing revenue over the last few years [31]. This is perhaps not surprising since only a 
small minority of new medicines are truly innovative, with the vast majority similar or marginally better 
than existing standards [11, 102, 119]. To avoid rejection, pharmaceutical companies would have to 
adopt other strategies including improved targeting and price deals [5, 31, 34, 120] although there are 
concerns with pricing deals [121]. 
 
Just as there is an increasing interest in the evaluation of thresholds through opportunity costs, the 
introduction of social values in the economic analysis have also been debated. The social values 
might influence decisions considering the appeal for equity, transparency, severity of illness, orphan 
conditions, wider social benefits, externalities and innovation [2, 13, 14, 18, 24, 29, 37, 55, 58, 59, 60, 
61, 62, 63, 85, 102, 114, 122]. Altruistic motives may play an important role in systems based on 
solidarity [5, 23, 52, 54].  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
All methods for the establishment of a cost-effectiveness threshold have drawbacks. The precedent 
method does not have a solid scientific background and might generate overestimated or 
underestimated values. The WTP methodology might lead to an overestimated value of the threshold 
for public care also, and is not directly associated to affordability. Both methods might lead to 
uncontrolled health expenses and negative net health benefits. The opportunity cost methods are 
difficult to implement in practice since information is difficult to obtain, and the budget, the intervention 
costs and social preferences, might change over time. However, the opportunity cost approach allows 
the maximization of health benefits within budget constraints. Consequently, it might be the most 
recommendable approach to set thresholds in LMICs given their limited budgets despite the 
difficulties associated with data collection and reliability. 
 
For most countries evaluated, it can be shown that the threshold value actually set and considered for 
decision making, when it exists, is typically less than three times GDP per capita/QALY or DALY. With 
that in mind, the use of WHO-&+2,&(¶VLQLWLDOWKUHVKROGWRLVVXHUHFRPPendations on cost-
effectiveness studies might justify requests of higher prices by pharmaceutical companies in HTA 
studies, recommend inefficient technologies for funding and lead to increasing healthcare spending. 
In the places where the threshold was calculated according to budgets, the various agendas of 
different stakeholders still have to be balanced for decision-making. Overall, the threshold values 
implicitly or explicitly defined, for the countries analyzed, seem not to be in accordance with the 
opportunity costs, since these values are usually higher than they should be for a context with budget 
constraints. Multinational analysis demonstrated a need for a greater focus on value for money in 
countries with fewer resources available for healthcare spending.  
 
6 EXPERT COMENTARY AND FIVE-YEAR VIEW 
 
What can this study tell us about the use of CETs in HTA?  The concept of a CET has been long 
established, and has had an important role in academic thinking, and (perhaps to a lesser but still 
non-negligiblHH[WHQWLQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVRIPDQ\FRXQWULHV¶KHDOWKV\VWHPV,QWKLVVHQVH&(7VKDYH
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KDGDQLPSRUWDQWUROHDVD³EULGJLQJFRQFHSW´EHWZHHQWKHZRUOGRIDFDGHPLFUHVHDUFKDQGWKH³UHDO
ZRUOG´RIKHDOWKFDUHSULRULWL]DWLRQDVLWDFWXDOO\KDSSHQVWKURXJK the healthcare system.  
 
Nevertheless, as this study demonstrates, the concept of CET is not free from controversy.  Most 
notably, there are multiple methods, reviewed in this paper, to determine the CET and they do not all 
produce the same answer.  In general, one may expect that the supply-side methods such as the 
opportunity cost approach will produce lower estimates than demand-side methods such as 
willingness-to-pay.  The stakes involved in getting a wrong estimate are significant: a CET estimate 
that is too low will result in patients being denied care and underspent or wasted budgets; whereas an 
estimate which is too high will result in exploding healthcare budgets and some patients loosing out 
within fixed financial budgets. Thresholds which are clearly far too high (such as the three times GDP 
per capita threshold) should be increasingly questioned since whilst new medicines could be 
QRPLQDOO\³FRVW-HIIHFWLYH´DFFRUGLQJWRWKLVFULWHULRQLWLVQRWWKHFDVHWKDWHYHU\QHZPHGLFLQH
achieving this is affordable, and decisions end up being made on the basis of implicit criteria and 
lobbying, which is not in the best interest of all key stakeholder groups. 
 
We also highlight in this paper that there are considerable differences between countries in terms of 
their use of CET and cost-effectiveness information in general.  In some countries, the use of CETs 
has been rejected because of poor fit with existing local legal or administrative cultures or because 
(especially in small and poor countries) of the high costs of checking each new technology against a 
CET.  In other countries, however, the use of CETs has been rejected or constrained because of a 
genuine belief that the methodology does not fully take into account important social values, such as 
concern for the worst off.   
 
We do believe that for large, and reasonably well-off countries with universal health systems (such as 
Brazil), the use of CETs is appropriate.  With all their weaknesses, CETs do provide clarity and 
transparency on what the budget holders ± in democracies, the citizens ± are getting for their money, 
and do provide a stable environment for innovators to invest in new products, in confidence about the 
rules which will determine reimbursement.  However, we appreciate the need to experiment with 
different ways of using CETs both at the national and (in countries which operate on a federal model) 
at the state level to arrive at processes and institutions which respect and are acceptable within the 
local context.  This also includes issues of affordability as seen with the recent medicines for treating 
patients with hepatitis C since whilst cost-effective, funding all patients at initial requested prices 
would have increased total pharmaceutical expenditure within a country by up to four fold severely 
impacting on medicine availability for other patients [123]. Decision rules for determining pricing and 
reimbursement reflect important national values: the countries which have the most sophisticated and 
mature systems for using HTA have built their systems over many years through interaction between 
government, industry and academic stakeholders.  Learning from international experience is 
essential, but there are no shortcuts. 
 
In terms of our five-year outlook, we expect to see the following:  firstly, we expect to see greater 
realism in setting CETs and greater linkage to what health systems can actually afford. In some 
jurisdictions, the CET may actually decline as demand pressures on the system increase and as 
populations age.  How to manage the political consequences from a declining published CET is not a 
problem which any country has yet managed to effectively grapple with.  Secondly, we expect to see 
greater use of multicriteria (MCDA) methods and perhaps also new wellbeing measures to capture a 
broader range of outcomes and ethically relevant factors in decision making. This happens in practice 
at the moment in many countries but the academic literature has so far not provided an appropriate 
frame for thinking about this, and it is neglected in the most authoritative HTA textbooks.  Thirdly, we 
expect to see greater use of CET to look at existing practice: it is important to remember that what is 
cost-effective or not is not a technology per se but technology as it is used by a particular patient with 
a particular disease, medical history and prognosis. CETs can have an important role in optimizing 
treatment, for example in ensuring that technology is targeted on the subpopulation which presents 
the greatest (and most clearly cost-effective) opportunity to generate health benefits, perhaps by 
upscaling the use of out-of-patent technology with mass potential, such as lipid lowering agents.  
Such considerations, and the corresponding need for re-analysis and price re-negotiations, will grow 
as many standard medicines loose their patents and become available as low cost generics and 
biosimilars. Fourthly, we expect, quite simply to see greater use of CETs in countries around the 
world.  For the foreseeable future, many countries will face demands rising faster than funding due to 
an ageing population, and a consequent need to focus minds on efficiency. Small countries are 
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banding together to ensure that they are able to secure the sorts of price transparency and reductions 
which are denied to them individually because of their scale. Poor countries, and hitherto poor but 
growing countries are expanding their universal coverage programmes and building analytic capacity 
but still face the need to explain to their populations why some new and effective technologies may 
not be available through the public system.  All these factors predispose countries to use CETs in 
making decisions about what to fund and at what price. 
 
The use of CETs for determining reimbursing healthcare technologies is replete with problems, as 
reviewed in this paper.  However, the alternatives obscure the link between payment and health 
gained, and this link is essential if the funds which go into the healthcare system are to be spent 
wisely. 
 
7 KEY ISSUES 
 
x An increase on the value of the threshold enables the pharmaceutical industry to request higher 
prices for its products, but can have adverse effects for cost control in the public system. A well-
defined threshold value has the power to drive prices to acceptable levels. 
 
x It is difficult to understand how much the economic analysis really influences decisions. In some 
countries like Brazil and Germany, the economic analysis is considered a secondary criterion to 
effectiveness, efficacy and safety.  
 
x The use of WHO-&+2,&(¶VWKUHVKROGWRLVVXHUHFRPPendations on cost-effectiveness studies 
might not justify the setting of higher prices by pharmaceutical companies. The incorporation of 
such inefficient health technologies overburdens the budgets of health systems. 
 
x In countries where the threshold was calculated according to budgets, there are still other 
interests that have to be respected for decision making, for example concern for the worst off 
patients.  
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